Même s’ils ne sont pas volumineux, les commentaires de l’Ecriture tiennent une place essentielle dans la pratique théologique de S. Thomas. Après avoir rappelé ses clés de lecture et d’interprétation du texte biblique selon les coutumes et traditions de son temps, G. Berceville en vient, à propos du texte crucial de Rm 7,14-25 au « je » du discours de Paul tel que le perçoit S. Thomas. Tout en tenant compte de ce qu’en avaient dit les « Autorités », S. (...) Thomas n’en marquait pas moins ses « préférences » : ce texte, sur le bien difficile à faire et le mal qui se présente au « je », s’applique aussi bien au juste qu’au pécheur. En contrepoint, la lecture de Luther, en réaction contre le naturalisme de la Renaissance, se trouve au terme d’une transformation radicale de la raison et de la philosophie. Cette « lecture » dit à la fois l’étrangeté aujourd’hui de l’exégèse de Thomas et la sensibilité Luther à la dimension historique de l’homme, ce qui structure son « anthropologie théologique ». La question est posée : est-il possible aujourd’hui de se mettre à l’école de Thomas le contemplatif sans rien perdre de l’attention inquiète que notre modernité porte à l’histoire où Dieu vient et fait grâce ?Although they are not voluminous, St. Thomas’s commentaries on Scripture are essential to his practical theology. After recalling the keys to reading and interpreting Biblical texts according to the customs and traditions of his time, G. Berceville arrives at St. Thomas’ interpretation of the “I” in the discourse of St. Paul in the crucial text of Rm 7, 14-25. While taking into account what the “Authorities had said,” St. Thomas nevertheless pointed out his “preferences.” This text, concerning the good which is difficult to do and the evil that presents itself to the “I”, can be applied to the just man as well as to the sinner. In contrast, Luther’s reading – a reaction against the naturalism of the Renaissance – came at the end of a radical transformation of reason and philosophy. This “reading” reveals both the strangeness of Thomas’ exegesis today, and Luther’s sensitivity to the historical dimension of man, which structures his “theological anthropology.” It also raises the question: Is it possible today to follow the school of Thomas the contemplative without losing the uneasy attention our modernity brings to history which God enters and saves? (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

Meillassoux seeks knowledge of transcendental reality, blaming Kant for the ‘correlationist’ proscription of independent access to either thought or being. For Meillassoux, correlationism blocks an account of the meaning of ‘ancestral statements’ regarding reality prior to humans. I examine three charges on which Meillassoux’s argument depends: (1) Kant distorts ancestral statements’ meaning; (2) Kant fallaciously infers causality’s necessity; (3) Kant’s transcendental idealism cannot grasp ‘the great outdoors’. I reject these charges: (1) imposes a Cartesian misreading, hence Meillassoux’s false assumption that, (...) for Kant, objects don’t exist without subjects; (2) misreads Kant, who infers causality’s necessity from the possibility of experience; (3) casts Kant’s idealism as subjective, ignoring his perspectival portrayal of it. (shrink)

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Certain belief-ascription statements suggest that people can think about the same object, even if that object doesn't exist. Peter Geach, who in 1967 first discussed these statements, gave them the name of statements of intentional identity. In an especially puzzling form of these statements, a pronoun in one belief clause has its antecedent in another: "Hob believes a witch is F, and Nob believes she is G." In this form, the statements raise three interesting problems. They generate puzzles for a (...) program in philosophy of mind, according to which intentional properties of thought are to be analyzed as theoretical analogs of something independently explicable. They are beyond the scope of standard intensional logic , and therefore jeopardize its explanatory value in certain respects. For instance, they jeopardize the received theory of the de dicto/de re distinction in terms of the scope distinctions of SIL. They pose problems for certain theories of anaphoric pronouns, in the context of SIL. ;At first it seems possible to modify SIL so as to yield a quantificational interpretation of the recalcitrant intentional identity statements. In the modified theory, the statements are analyzed so that a wide-scope quantifier binds variables in separate belief contexts. The problem with such quantificational theories is that they are unable to account for another puzzle about intentional identity. Intentional identity appears not to be a symmetric relation: it can be argued that the inference from "Hob thinks a witch is F and Nob thinks she is G" to "Nob thinks a witch is G and Hob thinks she is F" is not a plausible one. A better formal approach than the quantificational ones contains two key components. The first is a framework for anaphoric pronouns combining certain features of quantificational, discourse referential, and demonstratival interpretations of pronouns. The second is the use of structured domains in the formal models. Various interpretations of the new formalism are possible, each drawing on a different analogical theory of the nature of thoughts and their intentional properties. The new framework explains in a unified fashion not only the apparent asymmetry of intentional identity, but a number of other perplexing features of belief. (shrink)

The paper discusses the origin of two Germanic terms for ‘Atlantic herring, _Clupea harengus _L.’. The Proto-Germanic noun _*siled- _m. ‘herring’, attested in most North Germanic languages (e.g. ON. _sild_, Far. _síld_, OSv. _sild_, Sv. _sill_, Norw. _sil_), cannot be treated as inherited. It seems to represent a Saami (or Laponian) borrowing, cf. Saa. (Northern) _sâlled_, (Lule) _sallēt _‘herring’.

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

In his article, a unified brain-based determination of death is described by James Bernat (2024) as a permanent cessation of systemic circulation causing a permanent cessation of brain circulation...

In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...) makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether. (shrink)

Resumen:Junto con Rebeldes académicos de Iván Jaksić (SUNY 1989; UDP 2013) y Una disciplina de la distancia de Cecilia Sánchez (CESOC 1992), este libro ya forma parte del canon bibliográfico selecto y escaso que propone investigaciones de largo aliento sobre la historia de la filosofía en el Chile republicano. No se trata de una reseña de nombres y obras, ni de una historia interna del desarrollo de problemas puros o escuelas. Más bien, su foco, en afinidad con las obras mencionadas, (...) son “las distintas relaciones históricas entre las fuerzas del poder y las razones de la filosofía […] las distintas inscripciones en los también múltiples quiasmos entre saberes y poderes” (14-15), asumiendo, de modo más sustantivo, que “el bloque histórico dominante en Chile rara vez ha logrado establecer un relato coherente de la dominación, justamente porque es poco lo que le importan las razones en nombre de las cuales ejerce la fuerza” (41). (shrink)

Response to commentaries on keynote article.

A directory of archives and manuscript repositories, with links to web pages for the repositories and to online finding aids. Searchable by: collection name; city; state; National Inventory of Documentary Sources (NIDS) number; and National Union Catalog of Manuscript Collections (NUCMC) number.

James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro present a new edition of R. G. Collingwood's classic work of 1933, supplementing the original text with important related writings from Collingwood's manuscripts which appear here for the first time. The editors also contribute a substantial new introduction. The volume will be welcomed by all historians of twentieth-century philosophy.

Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

Tarix boyu insanlar bir birləri ilə ünsiyyət qurmaq üçün müxtəlif vasitələrdən istifadə etmişdir. Bu ünsiyyət vasitələri təsrif olunarkən dörd kateqoriyaya bölünür. Sözlü, sözsüz, yazılı və şəkli ünsiyyət vasitələri. İnsanlar duyğularını, hiss və həyəcanlarını bu vasitələrlə qarşısındakılara çatdırırlar. Sözlü vasitə zamanı insanlar dil vasitəsilə ünsiyyət qurur. Sözlü vasitə daim yenilənməyə, inkişaf etməyə məruz qalan, canlı bir ünsiyyət növüdür. Zaman keçdikçə yeni sözlərin yaranması, ünsiyyət qurmaq üçün insanların artıq bir birinə daha yaxın olması (sosial şəbəkələrin varlığı) müasir dövrümüzdə yeni dilləri öyrənməyə maraq (...) yaradır. Yeni dillərə maraq yaranarkən, sözlü vasitə ilə yazılı vasitə, demək olar ki, paralel inkişaf edir. Özünü ifadə, natiqliq, ritorika haqqında təlimlərdə iştirakçılara verilən məsləhətlərdən birincisi bu mövzuda (danışdığı dildə xitab mövzusunda) təhsil almaq olursa, ikincisi mütləq və mütləq sosial olmaq olur, yəni öyrəndiyi, xitab etdiyi, fikrini çatdırdığı dilə məruz qalıb, qarşılıqlı söhbətləri daimi hala çevirmək. Çünki dil həm canlı həm də passiv olma xüsusiyyəti daşıyır. (shrink)

A central theme in the scholarly literature on Enlightenment Europe concerns the increased focus on the role of reason in the development of European thought, especially in the development of the new science by the natural philosophers. As a consequence, there is a tendency in both philosophical scholarship and teaching to bind philosophy and science tightly together. While there is certainly much that is correct in this approach, one motivation for pluralizing philosophy’s past is that this story leaves out a (...) great deal that is important in Enlightenment views of reason. We argue, using as an example the work of figures like Margaret Cavendish, that reason was significantly broader in scope—and that developments in science were paralleled by equally important advances in music, art, literature, medicine, philosophy, and other areas. In recognizing the lack of a sharp boundary between these areas, an inclusive canon of Enlightenment philosophy gives us this richer notion of reason. Integrating figures such as Cavendish into the canon helps us to see that the narrow focus on the scientific version of reason within Enlightenment scholarship creates a false distinction between science and the humanities and misses out on the humanistic ends for which we engage in philosophy. (shrink)

Currently fashionable among critics of enlightenment thought is the charge that Kant's ethics fails to provide an adequate account of character and its formation in moral and political life. G. Felicitas Munzel challenges this reading of Kant's thought, claiming not only that Kant has a very rich notion of moral character, but also that it is a conception of systematic importance for his thought, linking the formal moral with the critical, aesthetic, anthropological, and biological aspects of his philosophy. The first (...) book to focus on character formation in Kant's moral philosophy, it builds on important recent work on Kant's aesthetics and anthropology, and brings these to bear on moral issues. Munzel traces Kant's multifaceted definition of character through the broad range of his writings, and then explores the structure of character, its actual exercise in the world, and its cultivation. An outstanding work of original textual analysis and interpretation, _Kant's Conception of Moral Character_ is a major contribution to Kant studies and moral philosophy in general. (shrink)

“THE ONLY THING NECESSARY IS NOT THEORETICAL LEARNING, but the Bildung of human beings, both in regard to their talents and their character.” Kant’s epigrammatic observation in his 1778 letter to Christian Wolke, director of the Philanthropin, adumbrates not only his mature sense of “enlightenment” but also the pedagogical role of his critical philosophy and his own life’s work. Over a decade earlier, his reading of Rousseau’s Emile: or, On Education had “set him straight” about what constitutes the true dignity (...) of humanity, namely, that it did not consist in the advance of knowledge by scholarly inquiry as he had believed. The primary thing was, instead, the “restoration of the rights of humanity,” an objective articulated in Kant’s mature moral thought as that pedagogical method which facilitates the self-consciousness and efficacy of the moral law in the individual. In another 1778 letter, this time to his former student, Marcus Herz, Kant states that the “main purpose of his academic life,” which he “at all times keeps before him,” is to “cultivate good characters.” In both his lectures on anthropology and on pedagogy, Kant repeatedly emphasizes the need for education and, by extension, for attending to the education of the educator. Human beings are nothing save what education makes of them, but they can only be educated by other human beings who must themselves first be educated. As early as his 1775/ 76 anthropology lectures, Kant observes that “if teachers and priests were educated, if the concepts of pure morality would prevail among them, then... the whole could afterwards be educated.” The resulting task is clear: it is incumbent on every generation to work on the plan of a more purposive education,” a task Kant describes as the “greatest and most difficult problem that can be assigned to humankind.”. (shrink)

In ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Rules’, Professor N. Malcolm took us to task for misinterpreting Wittgenstein's arguments on the relationship between the concept of following a rule and the concept of community agreement on what counts as following a given rule. Not that we denied that there are any grammatical connections between these concepts. On the contrary, we emphasized that a rule and an act in accord with it make contact in language. Moreover we argued that agreement in judgments and (...) in definitions is indeed necessary for a shared language. But we denied that the concept of a language is so tightly interwoven with the concept of a community of speakers as to preclude its applicabilty to someone whose use of signs is not shared by others. Malcolm holds that ‘This is an unwitting reduction of Wittgenstein's originality. That human agreement is necessary for “shared” language is not so striking a thought as that it is essential for language simpliciter.’ Though less striking, we believe that it has the merit of being a true thought. We shall once more try to show both that it is correct, and that it is a correct account of Wittgenstein's arguments. (shrink)

Tarix boyu insanlar bir birləri ilə ünsiyyət qurmaq üçün müxtəlif vasitələrdən istifadə etmişdir. Bu ünsiyyət vasitələri təsrif olunarkən dörd kateqoriyaya bölünür. Sözlü, sözsüz, yazılı və şəkli ünsiyyət vasitələri. İnsanlar duyğularını, hiss və həyəcanlarını bu vasitələrlə qarşısındakılara çatdırırlar. Sözlü vasitə zamanı insanlar dil vasitəsilə ünsiyyət qurur. Sözlü vasitə daim yenilənməyə, inkişaf etməyə məruz qalan, canlı bir ünsiyyət növüdür. Zaman keçdikçə yeni sözlərin yaranması, ünsiyyət qurmaq üçün insanların artıq bir birinə daha yaxın olması (sosial şəbəkələrin varlığı) müasir dövrümüzdə yeni dilləri öyrənməyə maraq (...) yaradır. Yeni dillərə maraq yaranarkən, sözlü vasitə ilə yazılı vasitə, demək olar ki, paralel inkişaf edir. Özünü ifadə, natiqliq, ritorika haqqında təlimlərdə iştirakçılara verilən məsləhətlərdən birincisi bu mövzuda (danışdığı dildə xitab mövzusunda) təhsil almaq olursa, ikincisi mütləq və mütləq sosial olmaq olur, yəni öyrəndiyi, xitab etdiyi, fikrini çatdırdığı dilə məruz qalıb, qarşılıqlı söhbətləri daimi hala çevirmək. Çünki dil həm canlı həm də passiv olma xüsusiyyəti daşıyır. (shrink)

To incorporate medical ethics into clinical practice, it must first be understood and valued by health care professionals. The recognition of this principle led to an expanding and continuing educational effort by the ethics committee of the Vancouver General Hospital. This paper reviews this venture, including some pitfalls and failures, as well as successes. Although we began with consultants, it quickly became apparent that education in medical ethics must reach all health care professionals—and medical students as well. Our greatest successes (...) came in the formative years of a medical career (ie, in medical school and residency training programmes), but other efforts were not wasted, particularly among nurses and other health care professionals.Although this is a personal review of the experience in one institution, the lessons learnt in Vancouver are applicable to the further development of medical ethics in the UK. (shrink)

John Buridan was a fourteenth-century philosopher who enjoyed an enormous reputation for about two hundred years, was then totally neglected, and is now being 'rediscovered' through his relevance to contemporary work in philosophical logic. The final chapter of Buridan's Sophismata deals with problems about self-reference, and in particular with the semantic paradoxes. He offers his own distinctive solution to the well-known 'Liar Paradox' and introduces a number of other paradoxes that will be unfamiliar to most logicians. Buridan also moves on (...) from these problems to more general questions about the nature of propositions, the criteria of their truth and falsity and the concepts of validity and knowledge. This edition of that chapter is intended to make Buridan's ideas and arguments accessible to a wider range of readers. The volume should interest many philosophers, linguists and logicians, who are increasingly finding in medieval work striking anticipations of their own concerns. (shrink)